This paper investigates the impact of the Affordable Care Act's (ACA's) dependent coverage mandate on health insurance coverage rates and health care utilization among young adults. Using data from the Medical Panel Expenditure Survey, I exploit the discontinuity in health insurance coverage rates at age 26, the new dependent coverage age cutoff enforced by the ACA. Under alternative regression discontinuity design models, I find that 2.5 to 5.3 percent of young adults lose their health insurance coverage once they turn 26. This effect is mainly driven by those who lose their private health insurance plan coverage and those who lose their health insurance plan coverage, whose main holder resides outside of the household. I also find that the discrete change in health insurance coverage rates at age 26 is associated with up to a 3.6 percentage point decrease in office-based physician and and up to a 2.1 percentage point decrease in dental visits, but does not have a significant impact on the utilization of outpatient or emergency department services. Furthermore, the effects of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate on health care spending and out-of-pocket costs are insignificant. These results are robust under alternative model specifications.
Introduction
In 2012, over one-quarter of 19-25 year olds in the United States were without health insurance (Kirzinger, Cohen, and Gindi 2013) . 1 Several factors are likely to contribute to low insurance rates among this age group including low entry-level wages, high health insurance premiums, and jobs without any employer sponsored insurance plans. Furthermore, compared to other age groups, young adults are relatively healthy and less likely to use medical services, which may make the cost of insurance outweigh the perceived benefits (Timmins 2012) . The existing literature documents a strong relationship between health insurance status and health care utilization. In particular, insured individuals are more likely to use preventative care and less likely to be hospitalized for preventable conditions (Ayanian et al. 2000) . These findings imply that when individuals lose their health insurance coverage, they are likely to alter their health care consumption and spending (Anderson, Dobkin, and Gross 2012) .
Recent federal and state policy has aimed at decreasing the low insurance rates among young adults. Specifically, since September 2010, in the United States, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) requires plans and issuers that offer dependent coverage to make the coverage available until a child reaches the age of 26. This was a sizeable increase over the age of 19 years, the traditional dependent coverage age cutoff in many states before the ACA. The recent literature shows that this policy has significantly increased the number of young adults that are covered by a health insurance plan (Antwi, Moriya, and Simon 2013; Wallace and Sommers 2015) .
Individuals without health insurance coverage have different risk tolerances and medical risks than those with coverage, making causal inference difficult. To overcome this challenge, several studies exploit the quasiexperimental variation to measure the impacts of Medicare and Medicaid, the two largest public insurance programs in the United States (Dafny and Gruber 2005; Card, Dobkin, and Maestas 2008; Currie, Decker, and Lin 2008) . However, these studies focus on the near-elderly or the very young, both of whom are at low risk of being uninsured. On the other hand, the majority of studies that investigated the impact of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate on various outcomes relies on difference-in-differences (diff-and-diff) type models. These studies use different age ranges particularly for the control group with some including individuals up to 34 years old and find that for people ages 19 through 25, the likelihood of having employer-sponsored health insurance as a dependent rose by up to 7 percentage points, while the likelihood of having any health insurance rose by about 3 percentage points (Dillender 2015) .
In this paper, I consider the short-run effects of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate and employ an alternative identification strategy based on the age-based eligibility cutoff of the ACA's dependent coverage provision. In particular, I exploit the discrete change in insurance coverage rates at age 26 and use a regression discontinuity (RD) design to compare the outcomes of those who are slightly younger than the ACA's dependent coverage age of 26 (control group) with those who are slightly older than this cutoff age (treatment group). Since observable and unobservable characteristics of young adults are likely to be distributed smoothly across the cutoff age, the change in health insurance rates and health care utilization outcomes at this age can solely be attributed to the ACA's dependent coverage mandate. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that uses a RD design to investigate the impact of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate on health care utilization and spending among young adults.
Using detailed data on insurance coverage status and health care utilization from the Medical Panel Expenditure Survey (MEPS), I find that under alternative model specifications, 2.5% to 5.3% of young adults lose their health insurance coverage when they turn 26. This effect is mainly due to those who lose their private insurance plan coverage and those who lose their insurance plan coverage, whose main holder resides outside of the household. I also find that the discrete drop in health insurance coverage rates at age 26 has negative spillover effects on office-based physician and dental visits, but does not have a significant impact on the utilization of outpatient or emergency department services. Furthermore, I find that the ACA's dependent coverage mandate does not have a significant impact on health care spending and out-of-pocket costs.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes previous research on health insurance coverage and health care utilization. Section 3 describes the data, while Section 4 outlines the econometric framework. Section 5 presents the results for alternative samples. Section 6 provides a discussion of policy implications and concludes.
Background and Review of the Literature
The vast majority of studies investigating the relationship between health insurance coverage and medical care consumption compare insured individuals with those who are not insured and find that insured are less likely to have adverse health outcomes (Hoffman and Paradise 2008) . These studies also find that lack of insurance coverage often leads to expensive and avoidable medical treatments (Weissman, Gatsonis, and Epstein 1992; Braveman et al. 1994) . However, findings from these studies may not represent causal effects since people who choose to purchase insurance are likely to be different in unobservable ways than those who do not, and these unobservable differences may also affect health care utilization and expenses.
In order to address this potential endogeneity problem, few studies use data from randomized insurance experiments. A well-known example is the RAND Health Insurance Experiment conducted in 1970s, which randomly assigned individuals to insurance schemes with different cost-sharing rules. Brook et al. (1983) and Keeler (1992) find that compared with those with free access to health care, cost-sharing led to less total spending on medical care and fewer physician visits. Similarly, Brook et al. (1984) and Newhouse (2004) find that a high-deductible health plan considerably reduced hospital admissions relative to a free plan. Another wellknown example is the unique lottery in Oregon that allowed low-income adults to apply for Medicaid. Finkelstein et al. (2012) report that in the year after random assignment, the treatment group selected by the lottery was about 25 percentage points more likely to have insurance than the control group that was not selected.
Several other studies address the endogeneity of insurance coverage using quasi-experimental data. One group of these studies evaluates Medicaid expansions and changes in eligibility rules for Medicaid and Medicare. For instance, Dafny and Gruber (2005) find that relaxing Medicaid restrictions for low-income children increased hospital admissions and physician visits and decreased the mortality rates. Similarly, McWilliams et al. (2003) and Maestas (2008, 2009) find that the introduction of Medicare at age 65 leads to a substantial increase in health care consumption. One limitation of these studies is that public insurance programs target specific groups of people (young children, the very low income, and the elderly) and do not aim at increasing the insurance coverage rates among young adults, who have different medical risks and may be less likely to be insured. Moreover, many individuals who gain insurance through public insurance programs are often insured beforehand, making it difficult to isolate the causal effect of having insurance coverage (Anderson, Dobkin, and Gross 2012) .
Starting from September 23, 2010, the ACA requires health insurance plans and issuers that offer dependent coverage to make the coverage available until a child reaches the age of 26. For plan or policy years beginning on or after this date, all health insurance plans and issuers were required to give children who qualify an opportunity to enroll that continues for at least 30 days regardless of whether the plan or coverage offers an open enrollment period. Both married and unmarried children qualify for this coverage. This law applies to all plans in the individual market and to new employer plans. It also applies to existing employer plans unless the adult child has another offer of employer-based coverage (such as through his or her existing job). However, after 2014, children up to age 26 were allowed to stay on their parent's employer plan even if they have another offer of coverage through their employer. Studies that investigated the early effects of the ACA find significant increases in health insurance coverage rates among young adults. For instance, using diff-and-diff methodology, Antwi, Moriya, and Simon (2013) compare health insurance coverage rates of 19-25 year olds with 16-18 and 27-29 year olds and find that young adults were 30 percent more likely to be on their parents' employer policies after the implementation of the ACA on September 2010, compared to the time period before the enactment of the law. Antwi, Moriya, and Simon (2015) find that after the implementation of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate, compared to those who are 27-29 years old, treated young adults who are 19-25 years old increased their inpatient visits by 3.5 percent. Using a similar methodology, Cantor et al. (2012) find that the mandate increased health insurance coverage for young adults across all racial groups and regardless of employment status. Chua and Sommers (2014) find that dependent coverage provision was associated with an increase of 7.2 percentage points in the probability of insurance coverage among adults aged 19 to 25 years, but no statistically significant changes in health care use. They also find that implementation of the provision was associated with a decrease of 3.7 percentage points in the percentage of expenditures paid out-of-pocket among adults aged 19 to 25 years with any expenditures. In a recent paper, Barbaresco, Courtemanche, and Qi (2015) estimate diff-anddiff models with 23-25 year olds as the treatment group and 27-29 year olds as the control group. They find that the dependent coverage provision increased the probabilities of having health insurance (6.2 percentage points), a primary care doctor (3.6 percentage points), and excellent self-assessed health (2.2 percentage points). They also find that the mandate increased risky drinking but did not lead to any significant increase in preventive health care utilization.
Although the existing studies on the effects of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate rely on diff-and-diff type models, they use different age ranges particularly for the control group with some including individuals up to 34 years old (Sommers and Kronick 2012; Sommers et al. 2013; Chua and Sommers 2014) . Slusky (2017) and Barbaresco, Courtemanche, and Qi (2015) argue that different age groups are often subject to different economic shocks. Using data from Current Population Survey (CPS) and Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Slusky (2017) runs placebo tests using data from before the mandate and artificial "treatment" dates and show that the diff-and-diff regressions with these dates also produce statistically significant effects of the ACA on labor market outcomes long before the ACA was implemented. He argues that the effects that have been attributed to the ACA actually reflect overall dynamics in the age-structure of the labor market and reducing the age bandwidth yields more reliable estimates. Therefore, in this paper, I focus on the short-run effects of the ACA and use a RD design to estimate the discrete change in health insurance coverage, health care use, and health care spending at age 26. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first paper that uses a RD design to investigate the impact of the ACA's dependent coverage provision on health care utilization and spending among young adults. In contrast to the existing papers that have investigated the effects of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate, this paper also provides a more detailed analysis of the effects of the provision on different subpopulations.
In terms of methodology, this paper is similar to few recent papers that focus on the pre-ACA period. Before the ACA required all employers to provide health insurance to employees' children until the age of 26, many private health insurance contracts covered dependents through age 19 or 23 if they are a full time student Gross 2012, 2014; Cardella and Depew 2014) . 2 Recently, few studies find that before the introduction of the ACA, health insurance coverage rates among young adults exhibited a discrete change at these cutoff ages. In particular, these studies find a 5 to 8 percentage point reduction in the probability of having health insurance coverage at age 19 (Anderson, Dobkin, and Gross 2012; Cardella and Depew 2014 ) and a 1.5 percentage point decrease in the probability of having health insurance coverage at age 23 (Anderson, Dobkin, and Gross 2014) . They also show that the discrete change in health insurance coverage status at these ages leads to significant reductions in self-reported health status, emergency department and hospital visits, and inpatient hospital admissions. Furthermore, Yörük (2017) shows that the discrete change in health care utilization at age 19 is not due to the potential changes in risk taking behavior. In contrast to these papers, in this paper, I focus on the post-ACA period and use a different age-based eligibility cutoff mandated by the new policy.
This paper is also comparable to Dillender (2015) , who exploits the discrete change in insurance coverage rates at age 26 to investigate the effect of health insurance coverage on workers' compensation filing using data from Texas. However, in contrast to Dillender (2015) , this paper uses national data from the MEPS, which provides very detailed information on health insurance coverage and related outcomes and estimates the effect of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate on different outcomes, i.e. different types of health care use and health care spending.
Data
The MEPS is a survey of families and individuals, their medical providers (doctors, hospitals, pharmacies, etc.) , and employers across the United States. In addition to very detailed information on health insurance coverage status, the MEPS also contains information on the specific health services that Americans use, how frequently they use them, the cost of these services, and how they are paid for. The MEPS has two major components: the Household Component and the Insurance Component. In this paper, I use data from the Household Component, which provides data from individual households and their members. To supplement and verify the accuracy of information received from individuals, the MEPS also obtains information from medical providers, which individuals reported to have visited, such as the date of visit, reason for visit, diagnosis, and payment information (Medical Provider Component of the MEPS). Each individual is interviewed five times over two full calendar years. Individuals who leave their original family unit are followed and remain in the survey. Every year, a new panel of approximately 15,000 individuals is added to the survey. Therefore, two panels overlap at any given point in time, resulting in roughly 30,000 individuals being interviewed each year.
Since the ACA's dependent mandate was enforced after September 2010 September , I use 2011 September , 2012 September , and 2013 waves of the MEPS. I restrict my sample to those who are at most 3 years younger or older than age 26 cutoff (23-29 year olds) but also consider alternative age bandwidths such as 1 or 2 years as a robustness check. 3 Each respondent is asked about her insurance coverage status, the type (public, private, etc.) of insurance that she held, and her health care use in each calendar month during the two year period that she remained in the survey. Therefore, for each respondent, there are up to 24 observations for each outcome and more than 103,000 observations for the full sample.
In order to investigate the potential change in insurance coverage status of individuals upon turning 26, I create four binary variables representing coverage in a given month. These are whether the respondent is covered under any type of medical insurance plan (private or public); whether the respondent is covered under a private insurance plan; whether the respondent is covered under a public insurance plan; and whether the respondent is covered under a medical insurance plan, whose main holder resides outside of the respondent's household. This last outcome is particularly useful to test the effects of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate on those who do not live with their parents but are covered under their parents' insurance plan until they turn 26. In Table 1 , I provide the summary statistics for these variables. Approximately 68% of 23-29 year olds have health insurance, with older respondents being slightly less likely (67%) compared with the younger respondents (69%). Similarly, compared to those who are older than 26, younger respondents are more likely to have a private insurance (59% vs. 56%). However, the public insurance coverage rates of these two groups are virtually the same (12%). Approximately 7% of 23-29 year olds are covered under a medical insurance whose main holder resides outside the household, with older respondents considerably less likely (0.5%) compared with younger respondents (13%). As an indicator of non-urgent medical care consumption, I focus on office-based physician visits, outpatient visits, and dental visits. 4 Office visits include non-emergency medical care that occurs in a variety of settings such as doctors' offices, medical centers, and laboratory or x-ray facilities. Outpatient visits cover variety of situations in which a patient is not hospitalized overnight but visits a hospital, clinic, or associated facility for diagnosis or treatment. For dental care, I consider visits to general dentists, dental hygienists, and orthodontists. For each respondent, medical care utilization at the month level is the focus of the empirical analysis. In particular, I consider whether an individual use a particular type of service (a binary indicator of health care utilization at a given month), the number of visits per month, total expenditures for each type of care (the sum of out-of-pocket and insurance amounts paid, including the third party payers), and out-of-pocket cost for each service. Total expenditures and out-of-pocket costs are adjusted for inflation and expressed in 2013 dollars. Table 2 reports the summary statistics for these variables. Approximately 15% of young adults have an office-based physician visit in a given month, 4% have a dental visit, and 1% use outpatient services. Compared to those who are younger than 26, those who are relatively older are slightly more likely to use these services. In general, monthly medical care spending is quite low for young adults, with average out-of-pocket cost being $9.2 for office visits ($62.5 for those with at least one visit), $1.4 for outpatient visits ($125.6 for those with at least one visit), and $5.6 for dental visits ($145.4 for those with at least one visit). The MEPS also collects detailed information on emergency department visits. Table 2 shows that approximately 1.5% of young adults use emergency health care in a given month. Compared to relatively older individuals, those who are younger than 26 are slightly more likely to have an emergency department visit, but their out-of-pocket costs are lower. On average, young adults spend $2.7 per month for emergency room visits ($178.9 for those with at least one visit).
Methodology
The relationship between health insurance coverage and health care utilization and expenses can be expressed by the following reduced form model:
In equation (1), Y i is the outcome variable (health care utilization, health care expenses, or out-of-pocket costs) for individual i, Ins i is a binary variable representing health insurance coverage status, and u i denotes the unobservable factors affecting the outcome variable. The set of control variables, X i , includes family size, log of household income, whether the respondent reported excellent health status, and a set of binary variables controlling for gender, race, educational attainment, and marital and employment status of the respondent. The coefficient of interest is α 1 , which is the estimated impact of health insurance coverage status on the relevant outcome variable. There may be several unobservable individual characteristics such as different attitudes towards risk or medical conditions that are correlated with both insurance coverage status and outcome variables. Therefore, insurance take-up is likely to be endogenous and it is not possible to get a consistent estimate of α 1 using equation (1). The identification strategy in this paper relies on the assumption that those who are slightly younger or older than 26 have very similar observable and unobservable characteristics. However, due to the ACA's dependent coverage mandate, compared to those who are slightly older than 26 (who are at risk of losing their insurance coverage), those who are slightly younger than 26 are more likely to be covered under a health insurance plan. Since individuals have no control over their age, the ACA's dependent coverage mandate creates an exogenous variation in health insurance coverage status at the cutoff age of 26. I exploit this variation and use a RD design to estimate the relationship between health insurance coverage and health care utilization and expenses. 5 I first estimate the following RD model, which shows the effect of turning 26 on health insurance coverage status:
In this equation, the binary treatment variable is denoted by T i and is equal to 1 if the respondent is at least 26 years old in a given month and 0 otherwise and the coefficient α 2 is the estimated effect of turning 26 on health insurance coverage status. A smooth function of age profile, ( ), is the forcing variable in the context of RD design. Since, information on the birth month and year of each respondent is available in the MEPS, it is possible to calculate the difference between the date of health care utilization and the respondent's 26 th birthday in months. Therefore, for each respondent, the variable age i represents the number of months before or after the 26 th birthday. Modelling the smooth function of the forcing variable correctly is one of the main problems in implementing the RD design. In order to test the robustness of my results under alternative parametric model specifications, I estimate several different models that contain the first, second, or third order polynomial of the forcing variable, which is also fully interacted with the treatment variable. The age profile for alternative parametric models with different degrees of polynomials can be expressed as:
In the empirical analysis, I restrict my sample to all observations in which the respondent is up to 36 months (3 years) younger or older than the cutoff age of 26 (| | ≤ 36). Since the RD estimates may be sensitive to the selection of this bandwidth, I report results for alternative choices of bandwidths, i.e. | | ≤ 24 (2 years) and | | ≤ 12 (1 year). In all models, I exclude the month that each respondent turns 26 from the sample (age i = 0). 6 I also use the sample weights as reported in the MEPS and cluster standard errors by the forcing variable, which is age in months. The identifying assumption in equation (2) is that at age 26, the change in the insurance coverage status should be solely due to the age based cutoff and other observable and unobservable characteristics of respondents that may affect insurance coverage should not exhibit a discrete change around the 26 th birthday. This is a partially testable assumption. In the next section, I provide the results from a formal test which shows that control variables vary smoothly around the 26 th birthday. Therefore, they have little effect on the estimates of the discontinuity and serve mainly to increase the precision of the estimates.
It is also possible to estimate equation (2) using non-parametric estimators. For non-parametric models, following Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001) and Porter (2003) , I use local linear regressions to estimate the left and right limits of discontinuity at age 26. I estimate this in one step using triangular kernel which has been shown to be boundary optimal by putting more weight on observations closer to the cutoff point (Cheng, Fan, and Marron 1997) . The remaining estimation issue for the non-parametric models is the selection of appropriate bandwidth. Since the RD is identified only at the discontinuity, one needs to try to balance the goals of staying as local to the cutoff point at age 26 as possible while ensuring that there are enough data to yield informative estimates. In all non-parametric models, I use the bandwidth selection procedure that is proposed in a recent paper by Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012) .
In order to estimate the effect of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate on health care expenses and utilization, I plug in equation (2) to equation (1). The resulting reduced form model can be expressed as:
where α 3 estimates the change in relevant outcome variable at age 26. Similar to equation (2), using alternative bandwidths and functional forms, I estimate this model both parametrically and non-parametrically.
Results

Health Insurance Coverage
In Table 3 , I report the RD estimates of the change in health insurance coverage status at age 26 under alternative parametric and non-parametric models and bandwidth choices. The estimates suggest that 2.5% to 5.3% of the respondents lose their health insurance coverage when they turn 26. This effect is highly significant and mainly driven by those who lose their private insurance plan coverage and those who lose their insurance plan coverage, whose main holder resides outside of the household. In particular, under alternative specifications, I find that at age 26, the probability of being covered under a private insurance plan goes down by 2.2 to 6.3 percentage points and the probability of being covered under a health care plan whose main holder resides outside of the household goes down by 3.4 to 6.6 percentage points. On the other hand, the effect of turning 26 on the probability of having a public insurance plan is relatively limited and also the sign and magnitude of its estimate is sensitive to choice of alternative models. Figure 1 illustrates these findings. In each figure, I plot the mean of the outcome variables (the probability of being covered under alternative insurance plans) for one month intervals two years before and after the 26 th birthday. The solid lines are the first and second order polynomials fitted on individual observations on both sides of the age-26 cutoff as reported in the first two specifications of Table 3 for an age bandwidth of 24 months. Panels A, B, and D of Figure 1 clearly show the discrete drop in health insurance coverage rates at age 26 under any plan, a private plan, and a plan whose main holder resides outside of the respondent's household. The reliability of these RD estimates depends on several implicit assumptions, some of which are testable. I present the relevant tests in the Appendix A. First, I run a placebo test and estimate RD models with alternative age cutoffs in order to check whether the insurance coverage rates among young adults exhibit a discrete drop at the 25 th and 27 th birthdays. Table 13 shows that this is not the case. Models estimated with a quadratic polynomial of the forcing variable yields relatively small and statistically insignificant coefficient estimates for almost all health insurance coverage outcomes. The only exception is the statistically significant increase in insurance coverage rates at the 25 th birthday among those who are covered under a health care plan whose main holder resides outside of the household.
Although unlikely, those who are slightly older than 26 may be less likely to participate the MEPS. If this is the case, the density of the forcing variable may exhibit a discrete change at age 26, which would bias the RD estimates. However, Figure 6 shows that the number of observations around the 26 th birthday is smoothly distributed and there is no evidence to suggest a potential manipulation of the forcing variable. Another implicit assumption behind the RD design is that the change in the insurance coverage status should be solely due to the age-based cutoff and other observable and unobservable characteristics of respondents that may affect insurance coverage should not exhibit a discrete change around the 26 th birthday. This assumption is likely to hold since most obvious confounders are unlikely to exhibit a discrete change at the cutoff age. For instance, factors related to income, marital status, or getting an advanced degree should not bias the estimates since they are not directly related to certain birthdays. Graduations, for example, generally occur in January or June, but 26 th birthdays are distributed throughout the year. Therefore, probability of having an advanced degree should not change discontinuously in the month following an individual's 26 th birthday. The results presented in Table  3 also support this hypothesis. Parametric models estimated with and without control variables yield similar estimates. This suggests that the observable characteristics of the respondents do not exhibit a discrete change at age 26. I further test the possibility that other changes in observable characteristics of individuals may occur at their 26 th birthday. In the RD context, this is equivalent to testing the smoothness of all control variables around the cutoff age. Hence, I estimate equation (2) separately for all control variables using a parametric model that contains a quadratic polynomial of the forcing variable, which is also fully interacted with the treatment variable. For all control variables, the coefficient on the treatment variable was insignificant, which suggests that control variables are smoothly distributed across the cutoff age. 7 Figure 7 also illustrates this result for selected covariates.
Finally, some insurers provide extended dependent coverage until the end of the year in which the individual turn 26. Since the MEPS does not provide plan specific information, it is not possible to determine the respondents who were actually covered under a plan that provides this option. For comparison purposes, I assume that all respondents who benefited from the ACA's dependent coverage provision was covered under a plan that provides an extended coverage until the end of the plan year. Therefore, the cutoff month becomes the December of the year that the respondent turns 26. Although not reported here, under this assumption, the RD estimates suggest that 5.6% to 6.6% of the respondents lose their health insurance coverage until the end of the year in which they turn 26. These estimates are highly significant and larger than my original estimates. Therefore, while these estimates can be interpreted as the upper bound of the true effect, it is possible that my original results underestimate the effect of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate on health insurance coverage rates.
Health Care Utilization
I first investigate on the impact of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate on the utilization of non-urgent medical services. Table 4 reports the RD estimates of the change in office-based physician visits at age 26. The results suggest that the probability of an office visit goes down by 1.4 to 3.6 percentage points when young adults turn 26. This effect is highly significant under all specifications with the exception of the parametric model that is estimated using a cubic polynomial of the forcing variable and an age bandwidth of 12 months. Similarly, the number of office visits per month decreases by 0.03 to 0.09 points at age 26. This effect is statistically significant under majority of specifications and relatively large given that the mean of this variable is approximately 0.25. The change in total payments and out-of-pocket costs for office visits at the 26 th birthday is also negative and relatively large. However, statistical significance and the size of these estimates are quite sensitive to model selection. Figure 2 further illustrates these results and shows the discrete change in the probability and number of office visits at age 26. Figure 3 show that the discrete change in health insurance coverage at the 26 th birthday does not have a statistically significant impact on outpatient visits. In particular, although the magnitude of the estimates suggest that young adults become less likely to use outpatient services when they turn 26, this effect is statistically insignificant under all specifications. Similarly, the results for the number of visits, total payments, and out-of-pocket costs are mostly insignificant and the sign and the magnitude of the estimates for these outcomes are not robust under alternative specifications. In all regressions, sample weights are used and standard errors are clustered by the forcing variable. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Optimal Imbens-Kalyanaraman (IK) bandwidths are reported in brackets. The signs * and ** denote statistical significance at 10 and 5 percent. In Table 6 and Figure 4 , I report the RD estimates of the change in dental visits due to ACA's dependent coverage mandate. The results suggest that the probability of using dental services goes down by 1 to 2.1 percentage points when young adults turn 26. Furthermore, young adults tend to visit dental offices 0.014 to 0.03 times less per month at this cutoff age. Given the mean of the relevant outcome variables, these effects are considerably large and statistically significant under most specifications. However, the discrete drop in health insurance coverage rates at age 26 does not have a significant impact on total payments and out-of-pocket costs for dental visits. In all regressions, sample weights are used and standard errors are clustered by the forcing variable. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. Optimal Imbens-Kalyanaraman (IK) bandwidths are reported in brackets. The signs *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent. th birthday are plotted. The solid lines are the first and second order polynomials fitted on individual observations on both sides of the age-26 cutoff as reported in the first two specifications of Table 6 .
It is commonly assumed that uninsured patients visit the emergency department for non-urgent problems and contribute to crowding of emergency departments (Newton et al. 2008) . I investigate the impact of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate on emergency department visits and report the results in Table 7 and Figure 5 . The results suggest that the probability of visiting the emergency department goes down by approximately 0.2 percentage points when young adults turn 26. This effect is considerable but in general, statistically insignificant under alternative specifications. Similarly, the effect of the ACA on the number of emergency room visits is statistically insignificant. The results show that changes in total payments and out-of-pocket costs for emergency room visits at the 26 th birthday are also mostly negative and relatively large. However, statistical significance and size of these estimates are quite sensitive to the selection of alternative models. It is possible that young adults who are likely to lose their health insurance coverage at their 26 th birthday, anticipate this before hand and increase their health care consumption just before turning 26. This could generate a discrete drop in reported levels of health care utilization at age 26 even is there is no true change in actual behavior. In order to investigate this possibility, I compare health care utilization among young adults who are about to become 26 with those who are slightly younger than 25 or 27. One could expect that compared with those who are slightly younger than 25 or 27, those who are slightly younger than 26 would be more likely to use health care since the ACA's dependent coverage mandate should not affect the insurance coverage rates around these alternative age cutoffs. However, Figure 8 in the Appendix A show that the probability of using alternative health care services up to six months before the 25 th , 26 th , and 27 th birthdays exhibit similar trends. Therefore, there is no evidence that young adults anticipate the effects of the ACA's dependent coverage provision and significantly alter their health care consumption just before their 26 th birthday.
Alternative Samples
There exists an extensive literature which documents that individuals that belong to different demographic groups differ in their attitudes towards risk. 8 These differences may also affect health care decisions. In order to investigate the impact of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate on alternative demographic groups, I estimate parametric RD models for different types of insurance coverage status using a quadratic polynomial of the forcing variable that is also fully interacted with the treatment variable. 9 The results reported in Table 8 shows that the ACA has similar effects on health insurance coverage rates among males and females. Approximately 3% of both groups lose their health insurance coverage when they turn 26. Compared with whites, the impact of the ACA on blacks is more pronounced. Approximately, 5.1% of blacks lose their health insurance at age 26, whereas only 2.2% of whites lose health insurance coverage at the same age cutoff. One would expect that the ACA's dependent coverage provision is less likely to affect employed young adults since before 2014, if the adult child had another offer of employer-based coverage, she may not allowed to stay on her parent's insurance plan. Table 8 shows that compared with 4.3% of unemployed young adults, 3.6% of employed young adults lose their health insurance coverage due to the ACA. Unmarried young adults are more likely to lose their health insurance coverage when they turn 26. On the other hand, the effect of the ACA's dependent coverage mandate on married young adults is relatively small and statistically insignificant.
Rules governing public insurance may also affect the insurance coverage rates after the introduction of the ACA. The ACA created a national Medicaid minimum eligibility level of 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL) for nearly all Americans under age 65. This Medicaid eligibility expansion went into effect on January 1, 2014 but states were allowed to choose to expand coverage with Federal support anytime before that date. The MEPS has detailed information on income and categorizes individuals into one of the five income groups: the poor (100% or less of the FPL), the near poor (100-124% of the FPL), low income (125-199% of the FPL), middle income (200-399% of FPL), and high income (400% or more of FPL). Table 8 shows that the effect of the ACA's dependent coverage provision on poor and the near poor was statistically insignificant. This is not surprising since most of the change in insurance coverage at age 26 comes from a decline in private insurance, with very little change in public insurance. In fact, private insurance coverage rates for this group significantly decreases at age 26. On the other hand, the ACA's impact on low income and middle or high income young adults is considerable. Table 8 shows that 7.5% of low income and 2.5% of middle or high income young adults lose their health insurance coverage at age 26.
The main results suggest that the ACA's dependent coverage mandate's main impact was on the probability and number of office-based physician and dental visits. In Table 9 and Table 10 , I test the robustness of this result for alternative subsamples. Table 9 shows that the change in the probability of office-based physician and dental visits at age 26 is mainly driven by the change in male's health care use behavior. Compared with blacks, although whites are less likely to lose their coverage when they turn 26, they are more likely to change their health care behavior. In particular, at age 26, the probability of office-based physician visits goes down by 2.9% for whites, whereas at this particular age, blacks do not significantly change their tendency to visit an office-based physician. Similarly, although the ACA's dependent coverage provision is more likely to change the insurance coverage rates among unemployed, employed young adults are more likely to change their health consumption. Table 9 shows that employed young adults are 2.3 percentage points less likely to visit an officebased physician and 1.5 percentage points less likely to visit a dentist at age 26, while this age cutoff does not seem to have a significant impact on the office or dental visits of unemployed young adults. Table 9 also shows that married respondents are 4.5 percentage points less likely to visit a physician, 0.8 percentage points less likely to visit an emergency department, and 1.6 percentage points less likely to visit a dental office at age 26. Furthermore, compared with low income and middle or high income respondents, poor or near poor respondents are more likely to change their health care use behavior due to ACA's dependent coverage provision. In particular, this group of young adults are 3.7 percentage points less likely to visit a physician and 1.5 percentage points less likely to visit a dental office once they turn 26. Estimates from parametric RD models with an age bandwidth of two years are reported. All models contain a quadratic polynomial of the forcing variable that is also fully interacted with the treatment variable. All models contain a set of control variables as discussed in the text. In all regressions, sample weights are used and standard errors are clustered by the forcing variable. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. The signs *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5, and 1 percent. In Table 10 , I run similar robustness checks for the number of medical visits for different types of health care utilization. The ACA's dependent coverage mandate has a significant impact on the number of officebased physician visits for males and married young adults. Except for females, blacks, and unemployed, the number of dental visits significantly decreases for all subsamples at age 26. On the other hand, as for the full sample, the change in the number of outpatient and emergency department visits at age 26 is relatively small and mostly statistically insignificant for alternative groups of young adults.
The main findings suggest that for the full sample, the ACA's dependent coverage mandate does not have significant impact on total health care spending and out-of-pocket costs. However, most of the young adults occasionally use health care. In Table 11 and Table 12 , I investigate the effects of the ACA among those who reported having at least a single medical visit in a given month. Given there is likely to be heterogeneity in medical care use across young adults, this conditional effect may be more informative for understanding how heavier users of medical care are affected by insurance loss. However, one potential shortcoming of this analysis is the low sample size for several sub groups. This problem may lead to lack of power and also explain the lack of significance of the majority of the estimates. Hence, the results presented in Table 11 and Table 12 should be interpreted with caution. Table 11 shows that for those who used health care services at least once at a given month, total spending for outpatient visits increases by approximately $1379. This effect is marginally significant and mainly due to the increase in total spending of females. On the other hand, total spending for office visits for blacks and unemployed increases by approximately $185 at age 26, while total spending for emergency department visits increases by $466 for poor and near poor at the same age cutoff. Table 12 replicates the same analysis for out-of-pocket costs. Out-of-pocket costs for outpatient visits for blacks increases by approximately $758 at age 26. The estimation results for the remaining outcomes are statistically insignificant and in general, their magnitudes are relatively small. Finally, since all RD designs estimate local treatment effects, the results of this paper apply to individuals close to their 26 th birthday and cannot be generalized to whole population. Nevertheless, adults in their twenties, the age group to which the findings of this paper likely to apply, represent a substantial share of the uninsured population (Anderson, Dobkin, and Gross 2012) . Furthermore, in addition to being focused on a particular age group, the RD estimates are also specific to young adults who lose coverage because they age out of their parents insurance. These individuals may be different from the typical young adult. However, the findings of this paper should still provide useful information to policy makers since the results reveal that the decrease in health insurance coverage rates at age 26 is mainly due to those who lose their insurance plan coverage, whose main holder resides outside of the household. These are the individuals that are likely to gain coverage under the ACA's dependent coverage provision. 
